曾錚的世界

文：元曦

新元伊始，六合開泰，祈萬象之更新，迎九宇之春來。

遙想神州，風雲五千年，忍顧中原，板蕩七十載。

憶茫茫上古，人神同在。制禮作樂，煌煌三代。

秦漢唐宋承統，元明有清繼來，文明照耀千古，中華道統不衰。

然興亡之有替，中土應劫，有西方之邪靈，乃結禍胎。

號曰馬列，化形赤龍，乘虛而入，為禍為災。

殺人如麻而血流漂杵，改山造河而地暗天昏，

三教陵夷而文物盡毀，逆論無神而敗壞人倫。

更誅心洗腦，鬼獄森森，磨牙吮血，鷹犬噬人。

乃至道德崩潰，舉世唯利以是圖。假貨橫行，衣食住行以流毒。

哀哉！神州陸沉久矣，萬姓盡為涂碳，嘆永夜之淒涼，悲步履之艱難。

然天道之有常，物極必反，降九評以屠龍，拯我生民。

遂有三退之潮湧，乃集華夏之義士，

振臂一呼，中外響應，退黨團隊，共濟國艱。

書姓名於史冊，於今三億。作千古之豪傑，力挽狂瀾。

於是，戮赤龍於大野，萬里山川陣色，彰天討於九州，退黨大潮壯觀。

蕩寇之跡如江河行地，勢無可阻；

滅亂之功若日月經天，照耀人寰。

更將回歸正統，再續三千威儀，尊道重德，重振華夏衣冠

值此新年佳辰，誓與諸君戮力，淘汰舊勢，

展望二零一九，試看華邦再造，革天創元。

轉載自：https://www.facebook.com/notes/元曦/新元賦/745709115813751/

BY JENNIFER ZENG

December 31, 2018 Updated: December 31, 2018

News Analysis

The year 2018 saw the disillusionment of an entire generation of China specialists, and many former “panda huggers” have begun to admit that they got China wrong. Where exactly did they go awry?

Major Flaws

According to Cheng Xiaonong, a doctoral scholar on China’s politics and economy, the majority of U.S. scholars of China have ignored some very important facts about the country. In addition, the U.S.–China study circle tends to do research in a “closed way,” without comparing China with other countries, he said.

For example, Cheng argues in an article he wrote for the Chinese version of The Epoch Times that people failed to study how the enterprises of the 1970s and 1980s owned by “all the people in China” suddenly became enterprises that were owned by only a small number of people during the 1990s.

Some economists believed the “transformation” of state-owned enterprises was just to turn publicly owned properties into privately owned ones, and nothing else. However, the process of privatizing hundreds of thousands of state-owned enterprises involved the issue of privatizing a massive amount of state-owned wealth, while suddenly splitting dozens of millions of “state employees” into two parts: the laborers and the capitalists.

This process involved major issues such as the encroachment on state-owned assets, the right of the public to participate, and grave violations of social justice. Therefore, the evaluation of China’s economic reform shouldn’t be totally positive.

Cheng Xiaonong (The Epoch Times)

Cheng said that unfortunately, China scholars in the United States seldom study this important issue, and that failure leads to inaccurate views about the transformation of China’s economy. Because of this, these China scholars couldn’t see the serious social conflicts in China, nor could they form a good judgment about China’s future political direction.

According to Cheng, some American scholars also believe that an authoritarian government is more determined and powerful to push forward its policies and that’s beneficial for economic reform. Meanwhile, they ignore how the authoritarian government in China failed to defend its own interests.

For example, in order to turn state-owned enterprises into the property of a small group of people, former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji once closed down the State Bureau for State Property Administration. As a result, there was no oversight of the broad theft of state-owned property in the process of privatizing.

In this circumstance, the lack of oversight worked together with authoritarian repression to worsen social consequences.

But these concerns were overlooked by the American scholars who sang the praises of China’s authoritarian model.

Cheng also pointed out that many American China scholars hold that China is essentially different; their attitude can be summed up as, “China is China is China,” or “China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations.”

They are accustomed to treating China as a special entity that’s different from Russia and eastern European countries that are undergoing a transformation. Therefore, they lack a real international comparative framework for their study of China.

As a result, these scholars can’t see the forest for the trees, and some of their research conclusions won’t hold up, if measured against other international comparisons.

For example, many American China scholars believe that China’s gradual reform model is much better than the “shock therapy” of Russia and the former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

However, Cheng said, these scholars don’t really understand the content of the “shock therapy” of those countries. At the same time, they ignore the fact that similar phenomena also happened in China. Therefore, their conclusion that China’s gradual reform model is better goes totally against reality.

The fact is, in terms of price liberalization and comprehensive privatization, China also adopted “shock therapy.” The price liberalization happened in 1993–1994; while the comprehensive privatization happened from 1997 to 2002. And China’s “shock therapy” was much rougher than that in former Soviet bloc countries.

Democratization and Economic Transformation

Cheng said that some of the “panda huggers” in the United States tend to believe that the current “China Model” is the best choice for China, and that democratization isn’t necessarily suitable. On the other hand, some “China bashers” think that China should be democratized after it finishes economic transformation. For them, this is just “natural” and straightforward.

However, few people have studied the relationship between democratization and economic transformation via international comparison. Are democratization and economic transformation really “naturally born” twins that will always accompany each other in socialist countries?

As a matter of fact, Cheng says many “China basher” scholars aren’t aware that economic transformation could also snuff out democratization, and the so-called “China Model” is a typical example.

The “China Model” has proven that the privatization process was basically controlled by powerful “red” moguls, Cheng said. The result was a capitalist economic system controlled by these few. And this kind of capitalist economic system brought about by the “China Model” wouldn’t just block any political democratization, but also could be used to strengthen the powerful red moguls’ Communist tyranny.

Cheng said the powerful red moguls who had become industrial, financial, and real estate capitalists would try their best to block the democratization of China.

Democratization wouldn’t just mean deprivation of their political privileges, but also be a threat to their illegally accumulated wealth. Therefore, these red capitalists will hate democratization more than the conventional communists.

Not only that, these red capitalists don’t care about the future of China and its people, as they have transferred their wealth and family members to overseas countries. Some of them have even obtained foreign passports themselves. If anything goes wrong, they can easily buy an airplane ticket and abandon China.

So these red capitalists will seek to escape from internal social conflicts by making themselves aliens. They won’t seek political compromises for their own future in their own country, like the red elites of former Soviet bloc countries have done.

Lessons to Learn

There are at least three lessons to learn from China scholars in the United States, Cheng said.

One is that the scholars’ views are too narrow, with their attention only focusing on trivial changes in China, while overlooking the differences and similarities between the “China Model” and the experiences of other former socialist countries. As a result, they can’t benefit from international comparisons.

The second lesson is that they lack a deep understanding of the “China Model” and ignored the key fact that state-owned properties were seized by just a small number of people. Therefore a number of misunderstandings occurred. They couldn’t see the inevitability that political reform would only be blocked after the “economic prosperity.”

And the third lesson is that the scholars’ understanding of the progress of democratization is dogmatic. They have used their ideal to replace the inevitable reality and ignored the possibility that the Communist capitalism system would stop China from moving toward democracy.

source: https://www.theepochtimes.com/where-did-american-scholars-go-wrong-in-their-study-of-china_2753549.html

Once I heard that the land of Australia was meant to be kept for human beings in the future, but was discovered in advance. I also heard that many years later, the desert in central Australia will be turned into oasis…

聽說，澳洲這片大陸，本來是留給未來的人類的，卻被提前發現了；又聽說，若干年後，澳洲中部的大沙漠，都會變成綠洲……

曾有過開車往返於悉尼和墨爾本之間的經歷。這兩個全澳最大的城市相距約900公里，一路都很平坦。公路最高限速為110 公里。若有兩個人輪換開，12個小時左右能到，不算太辛苦。在大陸時曾聽說美國是駕車的天堂（那時油價還沒漲吧？），到了澳洲後，覺得澳洲也是開車的天堂。別的不說，至少從不堵車（有事故時除外）。

在澳洲這塊廣袤的大地上，不開車出遠門馳騁一番，未免辜負大好河山。這兩張圖片即攝於悉尼至墨爾本的路上。

不出城市，不知有此美景！成片的油菜花，只於兒時在四川見過，都快成依稀的夢境了。但四川的油菜花，一定是一小片一小片的，與同樣是一小片一小片的蔥綠小麥地間雜排布，嫩黃的油菜花借了小麥的青翠，顯得分外柔媚。澳洲的油菜花則在藍天陽光下一望無際地燦爛，好不遼闊奢侈大氣也！怪不得澳洲《國歌》驕傲地宣稱：「對遠涉重洋而來的人們/我們有的是地方與你們分享！（註：曾錚版亂譯本，原文為”For those who’ve come across the seas/We’ve boundless plains to share” 。）

遠看菜花地，就是這種感覺的。

澳大利亞被稱為「騎在羊背上的國家」，1990年時人均擁有9頭羊，現在也還有4頭多，總之是羊比人多就是了。所以這樣的牧場風光，在悉尼至墨爾本的沿途隨處可見。畜牧業、礦業以及旅遊業，都是澳洲的支柱產業吧？為甚麼稱福地呢？就是因為這些條件都是天賜的。不過，澳洲人也沒有停留在靠天吃飯的階段，近年來，教育業、高科技業、各種服務業，特別是金融業在國民經濟中所佔的比重正越來越大，悉尼已成為亞太地區最重要的金融中心之一，股市規模是除日本以外最大的。

大學時期讀到三毛的《相思農場》，幾乎也要像她一樣為那些「牛房豬舍」、「果樹蔬菜」發狂，但到底還知道那只是癡人說夢。

到了澳洲，遇到的第一個室友居然就曾經營過農場，還很大！據說在離墨爾本城區90公里的地方。

在澳洲，才真正體驗到甚麼叫「全民所有」，比如房子或土地，每一座，每一塊，都是屬於張三、李四或王五這些具體的人的，張三、李四、王五等等這些人加起來，就構成了「全民」，他們可是真正擁有這房、這地、這農場，或這礦山啊！而大陸的所謂「全民所有」，結果卻是誰也沒有。

這個攝於十月初，算是澳洲的春天。

這個攝於十月初，算是澳洲的春天。

記得以前在北京，每年的春天第一次見到任何春花綻放時，都不免有「驚為天人」之感；而在澳洲，花兒似乎一年四季都在開放，慢慢地就有些「身在福中不知福」起來。

以北京的標準算起來，澳洲根本沒有冬天，因為氣溫從來達不到讓百花肅殺的程度。在悉尼，穿一件最薄的化纖類毛衣，或稍厚點的夾克衫，基本就可過冬了。

這是墨爾本郊區一所普通的民宅。不但樹上是花，連地上的草地也開滿了小花。每日進進出出於花兒的包圍之中，這才叫艷福不淺。

澳大利亞的狗兒們也很有福氣。

這似乎是桃花。

真是「花有百樣紅」啊！

夕陽下的鄉間小屋

這張本沒甚麼特別，拍下它，只因為我的一個遠房親戚剛剛買下的一塊地就在其中。親戚到澳洲的時間不足十年，勤奮的工作再加上房地產市場的機會，已經使他成為「地主」了。除了已擁有兩三處房產外，還買了這塊地。他滿心喜悅地帶我去看，但還沒有想好，是在上面蓋個養老院好，還是建個度假酒店好。

這個，是墨爾本著名旅遊區「大洋路」的「十二門徒」景區了。從市區出發，有260多公里的綿延山路，到達時已是午後了。陽光很強，逆光拍過去，卻成就了這種剪影效果。

其實很早就聽說「十二門徒」，也就是這些矗立在海邊的巨岩，但一直無緣去。有一天忽然聽到「十二門徒」又倒掉一個時，心不自覺地向下一沉，說不出地悵然。有人說，地上的石頭與天上的神是對應的，如果真是這樣，「十二門徒」倒掉一個，意味著甚麼？「斗轉星移」的宇宙空間所發生的事情，對應在人間是甚麼？是生命，是很多很多的生命嗎？

最前面那座，應該就是倒掉的門徒。如今十二門徒中，只有八個「健在」了。

大洋路景區的魅力之一，就在於它天氣的不斷變幻所帶來的神秘莫測之感，特別是那陰晴不定的雲霧。

站在一望無際的大洋邊上看海浪層層湧來，拍打著千年矗立的「門徒」，心中空空的，有些落寞。「天父再來」時，它們還認得出自己的主嗎？

在不斷變幻的光線中，終於也捕捉到輝煌的時刻。

烈烈海風中，春花依然靜靜地溫柔。

大洋路旁的原野

原野之二

從「十二門徒」回來的路上，經一名西人導遊指點，抄了一條近道回墨爾本，不曾想有許多驚奇的發現，比如，這樣的牧場。那一片明淨的水溏，據說是給牛羊們貯的飲用水。

原野‧色彩

夕陽‧牧場

夕陽‧牧場之二

汽車經過這裡，發現一群花奶牛在靜靜地吃草，早年的「相思農場」病後遺症立刻發作，於是要求司機停車，急急跳下來拍了這張。

還有這張。

相思農場之三

其實風車只是發電的實用之物，但放在鏡頭之下，就算是三毛復活，也得再被醉死。

到了這時，已經在與光線賽跑了。太陽將落，就讓我的圖片遊記也定格於這樹與農舍的剪影之中吧！

By Gerard Traub

 As sunlight fades

from the shimmering leaves

and each heaving trunk

sighs to evening’s surrender

another day’s sojourn

seasoned with every hour

where time follows the line

between cold and tender.

When restless air

breaths calm to the eye

and skies close sudden

into a winter’s grey

each flower holds faith

through darkest night

until dawn and birdsong

find delight in play.

BY JENNIFER ZENG

December 28, 2018 Updated: December 28, 2018

The world believes a human-rights catastrophe is taking place in Xinjiang Province in western China, with large numbers of Uyghurs and other Muslims being herded into prisons and re-education camps.

But how does one document the scale of the detentions that are happening there?

Through arduous searching and researching of Google Earth satellite images, a Chinese dissident was able to locate 19 possible prisons and 15 possible re-education camps in Kashgar Prefecture (also known as Kashi Prefecture), in Xinjiang, with a total possible capacity of a half-million people.

Li Fang, who is living in exile in Finland, spent about a month to painstakingly conduct a “blanket search,” and “comb” through Google Earth images of Kashgar, looking to verify, or find evidence for, the allegation that more than a million people could be held in the re-education camps and prisons in Xinjiang, in a massive crackdown launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

While more than 80 percent of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang live in south Xinjiang, almost 38 percent, or more than 4.2 million, live in southwestern Xinjiang’s Kashgar.

So, Li concluded, studying that area might give the outside world an important window into the situation of all of Xinjiang.

Using the data history function of Google Earth, Li initially found that several prisons in Shule County and Kargilik (or Yecheng) County had been significantly expanded since 2017.

Then, he decided to “comb” through all the counties in Kashgar, and found as many as 19 prisons. If the sub-prisons belonging to two major facilities were also counted, there are as many as 27.

While searching and studying the prisons, Li also found some abnormalities with some buildings, communities or schools. For example, there are many wire nets or fences inside or outside of those places.

Through careful study, Li concluded that these should be the re-education camps. He found about 20 such facilities in Kashgar and figured that 15 of them are possible camps.

Li Fang. (Li Fang’s Twitter account)

Observation of Prisons

The criteria Li used to locate prisons are:

• There are thick, straight, and enclosing walls outside the area;

• Watchtowers higher than the enclosing walls can be found at two or four corners of the enclosed area;

• Usually, very obvious “patrol roads” can be seen inside and outside the enclosing walls.

• The buildings inside the enclosing walls are very evenly laid out and are at a distance from the walls. Usually, there are no vehicles inside the walls.

With these criteria, Li was not only able to locate 19 prisons, but also see the process of expansion of some of the prisons with the help of Google Earth’s data history.

For example, at 5.28 miles west of Yarkant County (geographic grid: N: 38° 24’47”. E: 77° 08’54”), a prison built before 2007 could be found, covering an area of about four acres, and with buildings having an estimated capacity of 1.83 acres (for example, a two-story building that covers an acre would have a capacity of two acres).

The Google Earth image of the same prison in 2014 shows that it’s been expanded, through 4.14 new acres of land. In the added areas, new buildings have a capacity of 3.48 acres, while two new buildings in the old area have a capacity of 0.77 acres.

A Google Earth image on Oct. 21, 2017, shows an addition of 9.28 acres, and buildings with a capacity of 5.89 acres, while an image on May 8, 2018, shows that another new area of 3.63 acres was added, with a building capacity of 2.67 acres.

So, as of May 2018, the total area for this prison was 21.07 acres, whose buildings had a capacity of an estimated 14.32 acres.

And Google Earth images indicate that the facility is still being expanded.

Observation of Re-Education Camps

The criteria Li used to locate re-education camps are:

• There are enclosing walls and barbed wire around the area;

• There are partition walls, or barbed wire, or iron fences inside the camps, which divide the building group into several discrete areas;

• There are watch-box-like facilities in the areas;

• The areas are very “quiet,” with no vehicles or very few vehicles inside;

•  The above characteristics generally appeared simultaneously after 2017.

Using these criteria, Li was able to locate 15 possible re-education camps in Kashgar.

A suspected re-education camp in Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Province, at about 2.45 miles east of Shule City, identified by Google Maps as an image taken on Sept. 8, 2018. (Google Earth image captured by Li Fang)

For example, at about 2.45 miles east of Shule City (geographic grid: N: 39 ° 24′ 27″. E: 76 ° 05 ’38”), a possible re-education camp exists.

A satellite image from February 2016 shows that the area looks like a school, which covered an area of about 8.66 acres, with an estimated building capacity of 3.01 acres.

Throughout the data history, an expansion can be seen, starting in August 2016. In July 2017, some blue-roofed buildings were added, and the density was quite high. In November 2017, expansion in the peripheral area began, and many houses around the site were demolished.

The expansion was completed in September. At that point, the total area was about 12.21 acres, with a building capacity of 12.91 acres.

Li said the sudden large-scale expansion happened after current CCP Xinjiang Secretary Chen Quanguo—the official considered to be responsible for the suddenly intensified repression of the Uyghurs—took office there in August 2016.

The buildings inside the area are of very high density. There are not only enclosing walls outside the camp, but many partitioning walls inside. Many watch-box-like facilities can also be seen inside. So Li concluded that the site could be a re-education camp.

Highest Cement Production Growth

Li believes that cement production figures corroborate the buildup of prisons and re-education camps in Xinjiang.

According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, cement production in China in 2017 declined 0.2 percent from 2016. However, cement production in Xinjiang increased by around 13 percent in the same year, which was the highest growth rate among all 31 provinces and cities under the direct control of the central government.

While the year-on-year monthly cement production in December 2017 for all of China fell 2.2 percent, Xinjiang’s output jumped about 65 percent, which also was highest among all of the 31 provinces and cities, and much higher than the area with the second-highest growth, which was Liaoning Province at almost 17 percent.

Nineteen provinces and cities of the 31 experienced negative growth in December 2017; 20 of the provinces and cities experienced negative growth in 2017.

Sudden Increase in Steel Production

Xinjiang’s steel production fits a similar pattern, Li says.

Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, steel production in Xinjiang had been falling, except for 2016, when it experienced a slight uptick. However, in 2017, Xinjiang’s steel output jumped almost 28 percent, with December’s growth at about 43 percent.

Li says the sudden increase in cement and steel production correlates with the large-scale expansion or construction of prisons and re-education camps in Xinjiang.

Conclusion 

By adding up the total building capacity for the prisons and re-education camps, Li came to the following conclusions:

• The total estimated capacity of buildings in the 19 prisons is 351 acres, and an estimated 262 acres was built after 2017, which equates to 74.45 percent of the total.

• The total estimated building capacity in the 15 possible re-education camps is 269 acres. And, except for one camp, they all appeared after October 2016, two months after Chen took office in Xinjiang.

• Prisons hidden inside farms, and without tall, enclosing walls or watchtowers can’t be located with the above criteria. Therefore, the actual number of prisons may be much higher.

• Re-education camps hidden inside large closed buildings, such as large markets, skirt buildings, underground facilities, or bomb shelters, can’t be located with the above criteria. Therefore, the actual number of re-education camps might be much higher.

• The total building capacity of the 19 possible prisons and 15 possible re-education camps is 620 acres. According to Hong Kong’s standard, the average living space for each prisoner is 4.66 square meters, or about 50 square feet. China’s standard is unknown. However, using an average area of five square meters, or approximately 54 square feet, by rough calculation, the 620 acres of buildings can hold a half-million people.

• If a half-million people are being imprisoned in Kashgar, that means 12 percent of the entire population in that area is in prisons or re-education camps. If 12 percent of the population of Xinjiang is in prisons or re-education camps, that would equate to 1.36 million people who are in detention, or significantly more than the United Nations’ estimate in October that a million Uyghurs are being detained.

A suspected prison in Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Province, at about 5.28 miles west of Yarkant County, identified by Google Maps as the current image. (Google Earth image captured by Li Fang)

A table created by Li Fang with information about the prisons in Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang, identified by Li Fang.

A table created by Li Fang with information about the prisons in Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang, identified by Li Fang.

A table created by Li Fang with information about possible re-education camps identified by Li Fang.

A table created by Li Fang with information about possible re-education camps identified by Li Fang.

2001年，我在澳洲申請難民面試時，面試官是位女性，我感覺她很快就相信我、同情我，且想幫我了。體現在：
1、她問我：北京官方是否認爲你是法輪功的領導？
其實在看守所，警察確實說，他們之所以在我半夜睡覺時就把我抓了，就是因爲我「名氣很大」，北京市一級領導都知道我，認爲我是頭，不能再任由我繼續去「煽動」其他人了。
另外，我還知道，當時澳洲的移民局如果認爲你在法輪功中是「領導」，就會批給你難民；但不是「領導」的，經常被拒，移民局的理由是，當局只迫害「領導」。
所以我非常清楚，這位移民官這樣問我，是想幫我；我如果順水推舟說聲「是」（警察也確實這麼跟我說的），那被批的概率就很高了。
但是我也立刻認識到，我如果承認了自己是「領導」，就把其他那些移民局認爲不是「領導」的法輪功學員給害了，再說法輪功學員中本來確實沒有領導。所謂「領導」，都是不了解我們的人亂想出來的。
所以我馬上否認說：「不是，我不是領導。法輪功學員中沒有領導。修不修、做什麼，都是個人的選擇，大家都是平等的，沒有領導之說。」
看得出來，移民官有些意外。
2、後來她又拿著一個有我照片的、我參加法輪功活動的新聞報導問：「那天你是否不知道有記者會到場？」
我立刻就明白她爲何這樣問。因爲在澳洲難民審覈時，如果移民局認爲你故意「製造」出一些使自己回不了國的事件，那是「用心不良」，他們反而不會批給你。他們認爲，你在等待期間的正常表現，應該是低調等候。
比如，當年我陪從中領館剛剛逃出來的前中共外交官陳用林去見媒體時，他的律師急頭古腦打來電話，不許他接受採訪，說這對他的難民申請不利。那次的採訪，真的就這樣黃掉了。
所以如果我順著移民官的意思答「是，我不知道」，那麼這事兒就算揭過去了。移民官確實想幫我。
但是，如果我答了我不知道，那就是撒謊了。
事實上，我到澳洲的第一天，就對後來「收留」我的那位功友說：我需要做三件事：1）找個地方安頓下來寫書；2）我要見媒體揭露迫害；3）我需要申請難民，你能幫我嗎？
所以，自那以後，我和其他法輪功學員一直在積極地聯繫媒體來報導我們的活動，或是我在勞教所內受迫害的故事。說我不知道，那就是說瞎話了。
法輪功修的就是「真善忍」，所以，面對修煉的原則，和難民申請的結果之間，我完全沒有多想，立刻就說：「我不但知道，而且一直在積極聯繫媒體來報導。我逃出中國就是爲了揭露迫害的，不然我不會出來。」
說完那些，我又說：「您有權決定我是不是難民（You can decide whether I am a refugee or not），而我則有權決定，我在被允許留在澳洲的每一天中，怎樣使用自己的時間。（But I can decide how I spend my time here while I am allowed to stay.）」
我說得很平靜，很誠懇，但也很不卑不亢。這是當時心境的自然體現，完全是不假思索就這麼說了。
看得出來，這一次移民官不但有些吃驚，而且有些被震撼到了。
我沒有多想結果。聽說中共曾施加很大壓力，不想讓澳洲移民局批准我的難民申請。
但她也一直沒有拒絕我的申請。等了快兩年，到2003年7月1日，我的申請批下來了。當時，我是墨爾本第一個在移民局這關就獲批的。其他的人都是很快被拒，然後再很辛苦地走下面的程序。
所以我很感謝那位移民官。我於2001年9月遞交難民申請時，我的自傳《靜水深流》已經寫了一半了，（沒出來時在中國冒著生命危險祕密寫作的。）我申請避難時把寫好的這一半拷在USB上作爲申請材料提交，但被她拒絕了，理由是移民局只接受英文材料。
我當時心裏還有些委屈，心想，我也不是想讓你看，只是想証明給你看，我確實在寫書，回中國確實有危險。
2005年，《靜水深流》英文版終於也出版了。那時我的難民申請早已獲准，但我還是專程去了一趟移民局，送了一本英文書給我的移民官做禮物，感謝她批准了我的申請。
我沒有見到她，只是把書和一個便條裝在大信封裏，請前臺的工作人員交給她。他們答應了。
************
今天突然寫出這些以前從沒想到過要寫的「陳年舊事」，是因爲看到明慧網一篇的交流，說不能用自己的「特殊性」來反迫害，因爲你「特殊」，別人不「特殊」的話，你可能就把壓力轉移到別的人身上去了。
我那時沒有悟到什麼「理論」，但本能地這樣做了。現在看來，是做對了。
走過路真的不易，大家都多珍惜吧。

圖：曾錚在修煉法輪功第五套功法。攝影：張炳乾，2017年6月29日攝於紐約中央公園。

By Gerard Traub

 Like a petal of a lotus flower

water upon the calmest sea

like gold inside a precious heart

a purest heart to be.

Like beauty of a rising dawn

hope upon the brightest shores

like worlds unseen and transforming

awakening as never before.

Like fields under falling snow

spring upon a darkest hour

like lotus and hearts now resplendent

destined to forever flower.

2008-09-11

歷史上花錢最多的奧運會結束了。在經歷了十幾天精心營造的「舉國狂歡」的氣氛之後，很多人在問：花這麼多錢辦奧運，值嗎？奧運開完了，中國的經濟又會怎麼樣？

澳洲發行量最大的經濟、金融類專業報《澳洲金融評論》（ The Australian Financial Review）在奧運期間連發三篇文章，討論中國的經濟問題。讀了這三篇文章之後，給人的第一感覺是：「秋江水冷鴨先知」。

《澳洲金融評論》八月二十日文章：「股市泡沫破裂 北京無能為力（Beijing helpless as stock bubble bursts）」

這三篇文章當中的第一篇是8月15日發表的，題目叫作：「區域經濟下滑，市場擔心中國經濟冷卻（Fears for China growth as region slides）」。

文章說，亞洲的經濟基本是靠出口拉動的，但由於美國及歐洲對商品的需求量的急速下降，這個區域的經濟也在急速下滑。文章引述Aberdeen資產管理公司亞洲分部的執行經理Hugh Young的話說：「中國的經濟有可能經歷動盪，而結果可能是十分糟糕(nasty)的。」

文章說，雷曼兄弟公司預計，2008年中國的經濟增長速度將從07年的11.9%降到9.5%，由於土地價格、勞工價格、能源及原材料價格都在上漲，人民幣在升值，質量控制成本、環保成本等等都在上升，中國境內的企業日子很不好過。由於這些原因，Hugh Young預計亞洲地區的股市在未來一年之中將繼續動盪不安，上升或下降20%的可能性都存在。

《澳洲金融評論》上的另一篇文章是8月16日發表的，題目叫「礦業奇蹟已經出現裂縫（Cracks in the Mining Miracle）」。文章提到，過去一段時間以來，金融市場上本來存在著一種情緒，那就是，拋售銀行股、拋售美元永遠是對的，買入商品永遠是對的。但最近一段時間以來，市場上包括石油、鎳、鋅、黃金等等商品的價格都出現了下滑，特別引人注目的中國的所謂 「購買經理指數（Purchasing Managers Index）」的下滑，由於中國對於資源的需求量已佔到世界總量的30%以上，中國的購買能力的下滑——特別是在花了430億美元辦奧運之後還會下滑——已經引起了市場情緒的轉變，人們開始非常認真的懷疑，中國的經濟，已經不能再維持之前的高速增長。

這篇文章做出的計算是，如果中國的GDP（國民生產總值）的增長率降到8%，國際上鉛的價格要跌38%之多，鋅和銅的價格也將跌30%以上。

所以，天天泡在物質交易市場上的交易員們，已經比別人更加敏感的感受到了，由中國的購買力所支撐起來的澳洲「礦業繁榮」的大廈，已經出現了可怕的裂縫。

8月20日發表的那篇文章的標題更加「聳人聽聞」：「股市泡沫破裂北京無能為力（Beijing helpless as stock bubble bursts）」。

文章說，神經過敏的中國政府能夠把奧運會「微觀」的局面控制住，卻控制不住天氣、污染和股市指數。就在奧運期間，上海股指跌穿了2300點，交易量也陷入新的最低水平。市場對所謂「大小非」股票的上市充滿了恐懼。

「大小非」指的是以前不能上市流通的國家股、法人股等，比例超過5%的大的非流通股就叫大非，比例低於5%的非流通股就叫小非。

說起「大小非」，想起了前些天看見一個很天才的網友的貼子：

「大小非就是對民間資本的第三次洗劫。」
「NO.1：50年代的公私合營，土地改革。所有的東西全歸國家了。一分錢不用掏。」
「NO.2: 股票，企業本來就是全民所有的，再賣給全民。」
「NO.3: 大小非，請大家再買單，把企業再買去。還沒有分紅。」
「這個大賭場什麼時候結束啊？莊家啊，你就放過我們吧。」

「我家有個沙發。我可以想怎麼用就怎麼用。但：
第一天皇帝說：沙發借我用用，就拿走了。
第二天皇帝說：沙發還在國家那裏，但你可以坐沙發，但要給錢。
第三天皇帝說：沙發還給你，你可以放在自己家裏用，但要再給一次錢。」

這個貼子讓人忍俊不止，但笑完之後，卻有想哭的感覺。低頭想想中共建政以來在經濟領域的所有「作為」，不就是這麼一個過程嗎？

如果說《澳洲金融評論》的這三篇經濟類文章，是金融市場內的專業人士憑著他們靈敏的市場觸覺感覺到了中國經濟即將放緩的「寒冷」的話，筆者想到的卻是：在維持經濟的高速發展已經幾乎成了中共唯一的統治性合法性的來源，及掩蓋其它種種矛盾和危機的唯一方法的情況下，一旦經濟高速發展的「戰車」停了下來，對中共政權和中國社會將意味著什麼？

原載於：http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/8/9/11/n2259403.htm

Today I saw that the Epoch Times had started to publish in installments Ding Shu’s book “Yang Mou“, or “Open Conspiracy: the complete story of Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-rightist Campaign”. This made me recall a true story widely known in my hometown Zhongjiang County in Sichuan Province in China; and I feel like writing about it, as a small “supplementary” to Ding Shu’s “Yang Mou”.

The “open conspiracy” of “Anti-rightist Campaign” was instigated in 1957 by the then  Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, and saw the political persecution of an estimated 550,000 people in China. Before that there was such a person in Zhongjiang County, who often expressed his dissatisfaction with the society, or “gave vent to his dissatisfaction with the Party and socialism”, if we use the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s language to say it.

A photo of “Anti-rightist Campaign”. The slogan on the banner says, “If you dare to oppose Chairman Mao, we’ll smash your f** head!”

When the  “open conspiracy” began, the Party encouraged everyone to “speak out loudly” their opinions and criticisms about the Party, to help the Party to improve. People who knew that person all thought: This guy must be talking a lot, as he didn’t need any encouragement to speak out loudly in the first place.

However, a relative of this person worked in Beijing then, and had learnt beforehand that the “Anti-rightist Campaign” was an “open conspiracy”. So he warned this person against saying anything during this campaign no matter what.

A photo of “Anti-rightist Campaign” showing people putting up posters to speak out their opinions and criticisms about the CCP.

As this relative was very serious when giving this piece of warning, the person chose to believe him. So then the campaign arrived, he did manage to seal his mouth tightly and said nothing at all.

However, the leaders and the “mass of revolutionists” all thought how come this person had no opinion at all about the Party given that he had always criticized the Party before? He must have been secretly criticizing “the leader of our Party and country” in his heart all the same. And this was called “defaming in your heart without speaking out.”

Therefore, this person was still labeled as a “rightist”, and earned himself a special title: “A Rightist Who Does Not Talk”.

I haven’t had a chance to meet this “rightist who does not talk”. However, I’ve seen another rightist in Hanwang Town, Mianzhu County in Sichuan Province.

After my father was publicly denounced during the “Great Cultural Revolution”, he was relocated from Mianyang, a bigger and regional center city, to the remote town Hanwang, which had only a small population of 30,000 people. My mother and I didn’t go with him then.

When I was 4 years old, my sister was born. As my mother couldn’t look after two children at the same time, I was sent to my father. Since then I had been living with my father in a shabby shelter built on a barren floodplain, with barely anything inside it.

A march on the street glorifying the “Anti-rightist Campaign”. The slogan in Chinese says “Carry through the Anti-rightist Campaign to the Very End!”

The only primary school of that small town, which I went to later, was as shabby as our shelter, and didn’t have a basketball court, or even a decent basketball stand.

However, inside such a school there was a dazzlingly handsome young teacher, who was so much taller than all other teachers. When I saw him for the first time, I immediately connected him with a famous Chinese idiom “a crane standing among chickens”. His handsome look, his air, and everything of his were so different and “out of place” in that shabby little town.

Later on I learnt that this extremely handsome young teacher was formerly a basketball player of the National Basketball Team, and was an excellent athlete with outstanding skills. However, he was unfortunately labeled as a rightist and relocated to Hanwang. His wife had divorced him; and he was there alone.

I never had a chance to speak to this “rightist” young teacher. When I looked at him from a distance, he always looked very mysterious to me. Sometimes I heard that as he was so handsome, many people wanted to do matchmaking for him. However, nobody dared to marry him in the end.

I left Hanwang after I finished my junior middle school. When I revisited that small town years later, I heard people calling him “Old Bachelor”. Twinkles had already spread to everywhere on his once very young and handsome face.

Later on, after the CCP somehow recognized the “Anti-rightist Campaign” had been “magnified”, and many of the convictions were revoked in 1979, I heard this “rightist” teacher tried very hard to be moved back to Beijing. But all his attempts failed.

Since then I heard nothing about him. The most possible scenario was that he could only continue his miserable life in that small town until he died.

3/12/2017

Chinese version available here.

中文版在這裏。

A photo of “Anti-rightist Campaign”showing a “rightist” being denounced.